Brahmasur Legal Solutions

The Supreme Court grappled with the constitutional conflict between preserving the critically endangered Great Indian Bustard (GIB)—revered in desert folklore—and expanding India’s international commitments to green energy. Recalling its prior blanket undergrounding ban across a 99,000 sq km area due to technical unfeasibility, the Court accepted the majority recommendations of a nine-member Expert Committee to establish a balanced conservation strategy. Under the "Species Best Interest" standard, the Court rationalized and expanded the GIB priority conservation zones to 14,013 sq km in Rajasthan and 740 sq km in Gujarat. It prohibited new wind turbines and solar projects above 2 MW in these priority areas, allowing a 2 MW threshold to support local communities without causing further habitat loss. All power lines 11 kV and below within these zones must be converted to Aerial Bunched Cables, and a designated 5 km wide southern power corridor was approved. The Court mandated that all sanctioned mitigation measures, including the undergrounding of 250 km of critical lines in Rajasthan, be completed within two years. Non-renewable generators were reminded that Corporate Social Responsibility funds must encompass Corporate Environmental Responsibility to protect this avifaunal habitat.

The President of India invoked Article 143(1) to refer fourteen constitutional questions regarding the Governor’s options under Article 200, the President’s options under Article 201, the lack of timeline, and personal immunity under Article 361. The 5-judge Constitution Bench ruled that under Article 200, the Governor has only three options: to grant assent, to reserve the Bill for the President, or to withhold assent and return the Bill with comments. Simpliciter withholding is unconstitutional; the first proviso qualifies "withholds" and requires the Governor to return the Bill, except for Money Bills. The Governor is not bound by the "aid and advice" of the Council of Ministers under Article 163 when exercising his options under Article 200, protecting federal checks and balances. The Court held that in the absence of explicit timelines, it is impermissible for courts to judicially prescribe absolute timelines or declare a Bill's "deemed assent" under Article 142, as it violates the separation of powers. While the merits of assent or reservation are non-justiciable, prolonged, unexplained, and indefinite inaction by the Governor is subject to limited judicial review. In such cases, the Court can issue a limited mandamus directing the Governor to act within a reasonable time. Personal immunity under Article 361 does not shield the constitutional office from limited judicial review of inaction.

Civil appeals challenged High Court orders concerning the mandatory applicability of the Teacher Eligibility Test (TET) to minority educational institutions under the Right to Education (RTE) Act. The Court reviewed the prior 5-judge Constitution Bench decisions, particularly Pramati Educational and Cultural Trust, which had held that the RTE Act does not apply to minority schools. Recognizing the conflict between the right to education under Article 21A and minority rights under Article 30(1), the Court referred the question of whether minority schools (both aided and unaided) are entirely exempt from the TET qualifications to a larger Bench to decide the scope of reasonable restrictions and basic standards of education.

The appellant challenged the display of a municipal building's name in Urdu alongside Marathi, claiming it violated regional language laws. The Court dismissed the appeal, holding that there is no legal or statutory prohibition under the 2022 Act on the use of Urdu or the display of an additional language. Urdu is recognized as a second official language in multiple States and Union Territories under Article 345, and the display of an additional script does not infringe upon the status of the primary official language.

Sunil Kumar Singh challenged his expulsion from the Legislative Council based on an Ethics Committee report, claiming the punishment was disproportionate. Respondents claimed immunity under Article 212(1). The Court held the Writ Petition maintainable; Ethics Committee proceedings are subject to judicial review as expulsion affects fundamental rights and the electorate's representation. Constitutional Courts can review the proportionality of legislative punishments under Articles 14 and 21, balancing the decorum of the House with democratic representation. The Court held the expulsion excessive, set it aside under Article 142, substituted it with a period of suspension already undergone, and ordered his immediate reinstatement as MLC.

An appeal addressed the validity of residence-based or domicile-based reservations in Post Graduate Medical Courses within the State Quota seats. The Supreme Court held that domicile-based or residence-based reservations for PG medical admissions within the State Quota are constitutionally impermissible. PG medical admissions must be based strictly on merit, and geographical boundaries cannot be used to restrict access to specialized medical training.

A PIL under Article 32 sought directions to all States and UTs to provide basic toilet and sanitation facilities in all courts and tribunals. The Supreme Court ruled that access to clean water and sanitation is a fundamental right under Article 21. Access to justice is incomplete without a healthy, safe, and hygienic environment for litigants, advocates, and judicial staff. The Court issued mandatory directions to ensure gender-segregated and disability-accessible toilets are maintained across all court complexes, with a compliance report to be filed.

In an appeal against an Allahabad High Court judgment that acquitted the respondents, the Supreme Court restored the trial court's conviction of a husband and mother-in-law for the dowry death of Nasrin. Nasrin was set ablaze after her family failed to fulfill post-marriage demands for a colored television, a motorcycle, and Rs. 15,000. The High Court had erroneously ruled that subsequent demands were improbable as the marriage was initially dowryless, and that the accused were too poor to maintain luxury items. The Supreme Court held that "dowry" under Section 2 of the Dowry Prohibition Act encompasses any property demanded before, at, or after marriage referable to the marriage’s consideration. Once the prosecution established that the deceased faced harassment "soon before her death," the mandatory presumption of causing dowry death under Section 113-B of the Evidence Act read with 304-B IPC arose, which the defense failed to rebut. While restoring both convictions, the Court took note of the mother-in-law’s advanced age of 94 years and severe physical frailty. Invoking humanitarian considerations under Article 21, the Court held that incarcerating a nonagenarian would compromise legal dignity and thus refrained from sending her to prison. It issued directives mandating anti-dowry education and specialized officer training.

The appellant hit and dragged a woman to death with a BMW, fled, altered his appearance, and was arrested under IPC/BNS. He challenged the legality of his arrest during remand, contending that his constitutional rights were violated because the investigating agency failed to provide him with the "grounds of arrest" in writing under Article 22(1) and Section 47 of the BNSS (formerly Section 50 CrPC). The Supreme Court ruled that the constitutional safeguard of informing the grounds of arrest is universal across all statutes and applies uniformly to IPC/BNS offenses. To satisfy Article 22(1), the grounds of arrest must be supplied to the arrestee in writing in a language they understand. Mere oral reading is inadequate as the arrestee is not in a calm frame of mind to remember voluminous details required to effectively consult counsel. In exceptional circumstances (such as offenses against body/property in flagrante delicto where immediate written grounds are impractical), oral communication of reasons is temporarily sufficient, but written grounds must be supplied within a reasonable time and, in all cases, at least two hours prior to production before a Magistrate for remand. Failure to adhere to this timeline renders the arrest and subsequent remand illegal, entitling the arrestee to immediate release.

An Assistant Commissioner of Police in Gujarat issued a summons under Section 179 of the BNSS to an Advocate representing an accused to "know true details of the facts and circumstances" of the case. The Supreme Court took suo motu cognizance and answered with an emphatic "NO": investigating agencies cannot directly summon an Advocate representing an accused to elicit case details. Directly summoning the defense counsel violates the attorney-client privilege under Section 132 of the BSA (formerly Section 126 Evidence Act), infringes on the client's rights against self-incrimination (Article 20(3)), and compromises the right to effective legal representation under Article 22(1). If a summons must be issued under strict statutory exceptions (such as fraud or illegal purpose), the officer must obtain the prior written satisfaction of a superior officer not below the rank of Superintendent of Police, specify the factual grounds of the exception, and remain subject to judicial review under Section 528 BNSS. Documents in an advocate's possession are not privileged if the client could be compelled to produce them; however, digital device seizure containing third-party client data is highly regulated and must be produced directly before the Jurisdictional Court for oversight. Salaried in-house counsel are excluded from Section 132 BSA privilege.

The appellant challenged an FIR registered against him under Sections 196, 197(1), 299, and 302 of the BNS for reciting a political poem critical of the "throne". The Court quashed the FIR, holding that registering such charges was a mechanical exercise and an abuse of process. A political poem protesting against the ruler does not promote communal disharmony or insult any religion under Section 196 or 299 BNS. The right to dissent and peacefully protest in a lawful manner is an integral facet of Article 19(1)(a) and is vital for the survival of a democratic society.

The Delhi High Court rejected a writ application declining to issue a mandamus to register an FIR for the suicide of two Scheduled Caste students at IIT Delhi. Parents alleged caste-based atrocities, while police closed the case as a suicide due to study pressure under Section 174 CrPC. The Supreme Court held that under Section 154 CrPC, registration of an FIR is mandatory if the complaint discloses a cognizable offense, including allegations of caste-based discrimination. Police cannot bypass this by conducting a parallel inquiry under Section 174 CrPC. The Court ordered the constitution of a National Task Force to prevent suicides and address the mental health concerns of marginalized students in higher educational institutions.

A writ petition challenged the power of arrest exercised by customs and GST officers without a warrant under Section 104 of the Customs Act and Section 132 of the CGST Act. The Court held that the power to arrest without a warrant is a drastic power. Officers must strictly comply with safeguards: they must have "material in possession" and record "reasons to believe" in writing that the person is guilty of the offense before effecting arrest. The recorded "reasons to believe" must be supplied in writing to the arrestee before production before the Magistrate, subject to limited redaction of sensitive witness details approved by the court. Guilt cannot be based on suspicion alone, and arrest cannot be made merely to investigate.

The appellant challenged his arrest under Section 41(ba) of the CrPC for failure of the police to inform him of the grounds of arrest, and challenged being handcuffed and chained to a hospital bed. The Supreme Court ruled that informing the grounds of arrest is a mandatory constitutional requirement under Article 22(1). The IO must prove compliance by demonstrating that the grounds of arrest were effectively communicated in writing in a language the arrestee understands. Serving the grounds to the arrestee's wife or merely recording them in a case diary is insufficient. The Court ruled the arrest illegal, ordered his immediate release, and held that handcuffing and chaining an hospitalized arrestee to a bed is a shocking violation of the right to live with dignity under Article 21.

The appellant, a retired senior citizen, challenged the refusal of the High Court to compound or quash criminal proceedings initiated under Sections 343, 370 (human trafficking), and 120B of the IPC involving a female domestic worker. The Supreme Court quashed the criminal proceedings, finding no prima facie case of trafficking or exploitation. Recognizing a major regulatory vacuum, the Court used the opportunity to direct the Ministries of Labour and Social Justice to establish comprehensive guidelines to protect vulnerable domestic workers from systemic exploitation.

The Supreme Court examined the High Court of Karnataka’s decision in Ashok v. Fayaz Aahmad (2025) regarding complaints under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act. The core issue was whether the Magistrate must issue summons to the accused before taking cognizance of such complaints. The Supreme Court agreed with the High Court of Karnataka’s view, holding that since the Negotiable Instruments Act is a special enactment, there is no requirement for the Magistrate to issue summons to the accused before taking cognizance under Section 223 of the BNSS for complaints filed under Section 138. This ruling ensures that the special fast-track procedure intended for cheque bounce cases is not unnecessarily delayed by pre-cognizance procedural formalities.

A 5-judge Constitution Bench was constituted to decide whether Indian courts are jurisdictionally empowered to modify or vary an arbitral award under Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996. The Court disposed of the reference by affirming Project Director, NHAI v. M. Hakeem. Section 34 does not expressly empower courts to modify or vary an award; the power is restricted to setting aside the award in whole or part. While Section 34(4) provides "safety valves" for computational or clerical errors, and the principle of severability permits striking down bad parts of an award, courts cannot rewrite contracts or substitute arbitral determinations. Article 142 cannot be routinely deployed to modify awards in deviation of core statutory prohibitions.

Special leave petitions arose from a copyright infringement dispute where the Gujarat High Court had dealt with an application under Order VII Rule 11 of the CPC. The Court examined the overlap of intellectual property rights and set the standard for Order VII Rule 11 rejections. Rejection at the threshold is only permissible when the plaint on its face fails to disclose a cause of action, and copyright claims regarding industrial designs must clearly articulate original artistic expression separate from functional utility.

An appeal addressed the strict applicability of the Limitation Act, 1963, to applications filed under Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act. The Supreme Court ruled that the 30-day condonable period under the proviso to Section 34(3) of the Arbitration Act is a strict statutory ceiling. Section 5 of the Limitation Act cannot be invoked to condone any delay beyond this 30-day period, as the special statute purposely limits judicial intervention to ensure finality and swiftness in arbitral proceedings.

The appellant, an Indian Revenue Service officer posted at the CBDT (Department of Revenue), sexually harassed an IAS officer posted as Joint Secretary in the Department of Food and Public Distribution. He challenged the jurisdiction of the victim's Internal Complaints Committee (ICC) to entertain the complaint under the POSH Act, 2013, arguing that under Section 11, only the ICC of his own controlling department possessed the authority to conduct an inquiry against him. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, holding that the victim's ICC has full jurisdiction over third-party employees. The Court rejected a literal reading of Section 11(1), determining that the word "where" in "where the respondent is an employee" functions as a conditional situation trigger (equivalent to "if" or "in case") rather than a geographical description of place. The statutory definitions of "employee," "workplace," and "respondent" are neutral and do not require both parties to share an employer. A narrow interpretation would force victims to pursue remedies in alien workplaces, defeating the remedial, social welfare intent of the Act. For civil servants, the Court clarified a two-stage process: the victim's ICC conducts the preliminary fact-finding inquiry, and the respondent's controlling authority acts as the formal inquiring authority during subsequent disciplinary action.

An appeal challenged a Division Bench judgment setting aside relief to a female employee claiming maternity leave. The Supreme Court allowed the appeal, emphasizing that the right of a woman to make reproductive choices without State interference is central to human dignity under Article 21. Depriving female employees of maternity leave based on a "third child" restriction violates their physical and emotional well-being and compromises the dignity of women who constitute a vital part of the workforce.

Writ petitions challenged the constitutionality of Sections 34(1), 47(1)(a)(i), and 58(1)(a)(i) of the Consumer Protection Act, 2019, regarding pecuniary jurisdiction. The Court upheld the statutory provisions, ruling that the legislature possesses wide discretion to determine and adjust the pecuniary jurisdiction of consumer commissions. Basing the pecuniary threshold on the consideration paid, rather than the total claim or value of the goods, does not violate the Article 14 test of equality and is a valid legislative policy designed to streamline consumer dispute resolution.

In an appeal concerning the entitlement of a spouse in a void marriage to permanent alimony and maintenance under Section 25 of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955, the Court held that Section 25 HMA maintenance is a substantive right that operates differently from summary maintenance under Section 125 CrPC. Spouses of void marriages are entitled to maintenance. The Court strongly condemned the misogynistic language used by the High Court in describing a woman in a void marriage as an "illegitimate wife" or "faithful mistress," holding such adjectives to be in direct violation of human dignity and Article 21.

An appeal concerned whether a husband can be absolved from paying maintenance under Section 125 CrPC merely because he has obtained a decree for restitution of conjugal rights. The Supreme Court ruled that a decree for restitution of conjugal rights does not automatically bar a claim for maintenance. The Court found that the wife had "just cause" to live separately because of physical and mental cruelty, including her ill-treatment and lack of proper facilities (like being denied the use of the household toilet). Section 125 CrPC is a measure of social justice designed to prevent destitution.

An appeal concerned the power of senior citizens to revoke gift deeds under the Maintenance and Welfare of Parents and Senior Citizens Act, 2007. The Supreme Court ruled that beneficial and social welfare legislations must be interpreted in favor of their intended beneficiaries. Under the Act, a senior citizen can revoke a property gift deed if the beneficiary fails to maintain them or provide basic physical needs, upholding their right to lead a dignified life under Article 21.

Elected councillor Poonam failed to disclose her previous conviction under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act in her nomination affidavit under Rule 24-A of the Madhya Pradesh Nagar Palika Nirvachan Niyam, 1994, declaring "Nirank" (nil) under criminal antecedents. Her election was challenged by the first respondent. Poonam argued that her conviction was for a minor, compoundable offense not involving moral turpitude, she was subsequently acquitted in appeal (after the election), and the result was not materially affected. The Supreme Court dismissed the Special Leave Petition, holding that a candidate must disclose all criminal antecedents of disposed cases resulting in conviction, regardless of the offense's seriousness or whether it involves moral turpitude. The veracity of disclosures is assessed strictly on the nomination filing date; subsequent acquittal does not retroactively validate a false declaration. Suppression of criminal past deprives voters of their right to make an informed choice, amounting to "undue influence" that invalidates the election. When criminal antecedents are concealed, the election petitioner is not required to plead or prove that the non-disclosure "materially affected" the election result under Section 22(1)(d), as suppression itself renders the election void.

In a batch of applications concerning the promotion, selection, and qualification of judicial officers, the Court addressed eight distinct issues regarding HJS recruitment. It deliberated on restoring the LDCE quota for promotion to District Judge to 25% as originally set in 2002. Further, it clarified that the minimum practice experience required to appear for the Civil Judge (Junior Division) exam must be calculated based on the rules applicable at the date of advertisement, emphasizing court exposure to familiarize young lawyers with litigations.

In a challenge to a High Court order quashing clause 11(k) of an employee's appointment letter on the anvil of public policy, the Supreme Court ruled that in an era of economic liberalization, public sector undertakings must compete with efficient private players. This requires them to review and reset restrictive or inefficient administrative policies to optimize performance. Restrictive covenants in employment contracts must be tested against public policy considerations under Section 23 of the Contract Act, balancing employer administrative overheads with the employee's career interests.